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This paper analyzes the eect of spillovers and congestion of local public
services on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions.
Households choosing to live at the same place form a jurisdiction whose aim
is to produce congested local public services, that can create positive spillovers
to other jurisdictions. In every jurisdiction, the production of the local public
services is nanced through a local tax based on households' wealth. Local
wealth tax rates are democratically determined in all jurisdictions. Households
also consume housing in their jurisdiction. Any household is free to leave its
jurisdiction for another one that would increase its utility. A necessary and
sucient condition to have every stable jurisdictions structure segregated by
wealth, for a large class of congestion measures and any spillovers coecients
structure, is identied: the public services must be either a gross substitute or
a gross complement to the private good and the housing.
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11 Introduction
In most countries, local public spending accounts for a large share of the public spend-
ing (almost 50% in the USA), and this share has been increasing since the end of the
Second World War. As a consequence of the growing role played by local jurisdictions,
another phenomenon appeared: jurisdictions belonging to the same urban area seem
to be more dierentiated in terms of their inhabitants' wealth (see for instance [1]).
A possible explanation is provided by Tiebout's 1956 article [2]. According to his
intuitions, individuals choose their place of residence according to a trade-o between
local tax rates and amounts of public services provided, which leads every jurisdiction
to be homogeneous. The formation of jurisdictions structure is endogenous, due to the
free mobility of households, that can "vote with their feet", that is to say leave their
jurisdiction to another one, if they are unsatised with their jurisdiction's tax rate
and amount of public services. An important literature dealing with the endogenous
jurisdictions formation  a la Tiebout exists. A widely spread belief is the self-sorting
mechanism of the endogenous formation process: agents will live in homogeneous
jurisdictions. This homogeneity can be expressed in terms of wealth, preferences on
public services, on housing, on economic activity...
Westho [3] was among the rst economists to provide a formal model based on
Tiebout's intuitions. In this model, households can enjoy 2 goods, a local public good,
nanced through a local tax on wealth, which is a pure club good (only households
living in the jurisdiction that produced it can enjoy the local public good, that does
not suer from congestion eect), and a composite private good, whose amount is
equal to the after-tax wealth. He found a condition that ensures the existence of an
equilibrium. This condition is for the slopes of individuals' indierence curves in the
tax rate-amount of public good space to be ordered by their private wealth. If this
condition is respected, not only an equilibrium will exist, but, at equilibrium, the
jurisdictions structure will be segregated.
Gravel and Thoron [4] identied a necessary and sucient condition that ensures
the segregation, within Westho's meaning, of every stable jurisdictions structure:
the public good must be, for all level of prices and wealth, either always a comple-
ment or always a substitute to the private good. This condition is called the Gross
Substitutability/Complementarity (GSC) condition. This condition is equivalent to
have the preferred tax rate being a monotonous function of the private wealth, for any
level of prices and wealth. Biswas, Gravel and Oddou [5] integrated a welfarist cen-
tral government to the model, whose purpose is to maximize a generalized utilitarian
social welfare function by implementing an equalization payment policy. Equalization
payment can be either vertical (the government taxes households and redistributes the
revenues to jurisdictions), horizontal (the government redistributes local tax revenues
between the jurisdictions), or mixed. They found that the GSC condition remains
necessary and sucient.
Greenberg [6] proposed a model of local public goods with spillovers among juris-
dictions, but did not consider the possibility for households to leave their jurisdiction
for another that oer a better "tax rate - amount of public good" package. He proved
the existence of an equilibrium under the d-majority voting rule.
Nechyba [7] developed a model with spillovers and housing, but, contrary to Rose-
Ackerman [8], housing is modelled as a discreet good, which diers on type, and
2households own their house instead of renting it, so wealth is not exogenous anymore,
since housing price may vary. In his model, spillovers between jurisdictions were al-
lowed, because households' utility depends not only on the amounts of local public
good provided by its jurisdiction and of the national public good, but also on the
amounts of public good provided by all other jurisdictions. After having ensured the
existence of an equilibrium under certain conditions, he identied sucient conditions
for a stable jurisdictions structure to be segregated. Unfortunately, one of these su-
cient conditions was the absence of spillovers between jurisdictions, which is a pretty
strong assumption, that might not be necessary.
In a second article[?], Nechyba introduced a computable general equilibrium model
of local public good economy based on [7] to provide intuitions about what policy
should be implemented by the central government to avoid a sub-optimal provision of
local public good in each jurisdiction. As the author pointed it out, the model may
be improved by the introduction of interjurisdictional spillovers and peer eects.
The eect of spillovers on the provision of public goods and on the equilibrium
have been analyzed by Bloch and Zenginobuz [9] and [10]. However, the authors do
not examine the consequences in terms of segregation the existence of spillovers may
generate.
This paper generalizes Gravel & Thoron's model by assuming that local public
goods may suer from congestion and create spillovers. Households choose a loca-
tion, each set of households living in the same place forms a jurisdiction. In each
jurisdiction, absentee landlords use the land available in the jurisdiction to produce
housing. Housing price is competitive, so, at the equilibrium, the housing supply is
equal to the housing demand for that price. Then every jurisdiction democratically
determines its tax rate (which is applied to households' wealth), and the revenues
generated by this tax are fully used to nanced local public services, that may suer
of congestion.
Furthermore, households may benet from other jurisdictions' local public ser-
vices. This assumption diers from the main part of the literature on local public
goods. However, considering that small towns belonging to a metropolitan area ben-
et from the public services provided by the main city is not outlandish.
Households are assumed to be freely mobile, so, once all jurisdictions have de-
termined their tax rate, households can leave their jurisdiction for another one that
would increase their utility. Equilibrium is reached when no household has incentive
to leave unilaterally its jurisdiction or to modify its consumption bundle, the housing
price clears the market in every jurisdiction and the local tax rates are democratic.
We assume that preferences are homothetically separable between local public ser-
vices on one hand and private spending and housing on the other hand within the
meaning of Blackorby and alii[11]. This assumption, though restrictive, seems to be
relevant with respect to recent data [12].
This paper aims at examining the segregative properties of the endogenous juris-
diction structure formation in such a framework. The article is organized as follows.
The next section introduces the formal model. Section 3 provides an example of how
congestion and spillovers can modify a jurisdictions structure. Section 4 states and
proves the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
32 The formal model
We consider a model  a la Gravel & Thoron, improved by the presence of a compet-
itive land market, and by the existence of spillovers and congestion eects. There
is a continuum of households on the interval [0;A] with Lebesgue measure , where,
for any subset I  [0;A], the mass of household in I is given by (I). Households'
wealth distribution is modelled as a Lebesgue measurable function ! : [0;A] ! R
+
- household i is endowed with a wealth !i 2 R
+ - with ! being an increasing and
bounded from above function.
Households have identical preferences, represented by a twice dierentiable, in-





1. Z is the available amount of public services households can enjoy,
2. h is their amount of housing,
3. x is the amount of the households' expenditures for other things than housing.
We assume that public services are a non-Gien good.
The utility function is assumed to be homothetically separable in the sense of [11]
between the available public services on one hand, and the housing and other expen-
ditures on the other hand. This property implies that the share of their after tax
wealth households will spend on housing and on other expenditure does not depend
on their after tax wealth, nor on the amount of the available amount of public ser-
vices. Consequently, the indirect utility function, conditional to the amount of public
services, is given by
V C : R+  ! R+
 (ph;px)(!i   pZ  Z) 7 ! V C(  Z; (ph;px)(!i   pZ  Z))
where
V C(  Z; (ph;px)(!i   pZ  Z) = max
h;x
U(  Z;h;x)
s.t. phh + pxx  !i   pZ  Z
and
  : R2
+  ! R+
(ph;px) 7 !  (ph;px) being a dierentiable, increasing and quasi-convex1
function.
We denote U as the set of all functions satisfying the properties dened above.
Each household has to choose a place of residence among all the conceivable loca-
tion. L  N is the nite set of locations.
Every location l has an amount Hl 2 R
+ of housing, belonging to absentee land-
lords that rent it at the unit price pl. Since housing is costly, and that households only
enjoy the housing that is located in their own location, then, obviously, no household
will consume housing in more than one location.
1A function f is quasi-convex if 8x;y 2 R+ with f(x)  f(y) and 8 2 [0;1];f(x + (1   )y) 
f(x)
4We do not rule out the possibility for some locations to be empty. If a location is
empty, then we assume that pl = 0 and that no tax will be collected. Households living
at the same location form a jurisdiction. We denote J  L the set of jurisdictions,
with card(J) = M.
We denote i as the measure of households with private wealth !i.
Since local public services create spillovers in other jurisdictions, the total amount
of public services a household in jurisdiction j can enjoy (Zj) depends not only on
the available amount of public services produced by jurisdiction j, but also on the




  : R2
+ ! R+ being a non-decreasing (strictly increasing with respect to j),
twice dierentiable, concave function such that, 8S 2 R+;(0;S) = 0,
 j is the available amount of public services produced by jurisdiction j,





where jk 2 R+ represents the spillovers coecient of jurisdiction k's local pub-
lic services in jurisdiction j.
Let us denote B as the square matrix of order M, that represents the spillovers
coecients, with 8(j;j0) 2 J2;jj0 2 [0;1] and jj = 1. No assumption needs to
be made on B. It can be exogenously determined2, or depends positively or nega-
tively on the amount of public services provided by the jurisdictions that generate
and/or receive them. The matrix B is not necessarily symmetric. We denote B as
the set of all square matrix of order M such that, 8(j;j0) 2 J2;jj0 2 [0;1] and jj = 1






 tj being the local tax rate,
 $j being the aggregated wealth in j,
 Cj = C(fkgk2J;fkjgk2J) is the congestion function, with C : R2M
+ ! [1;+1[,
continuous and non-decreasing (with respect to every argument).
Assuming that the intensity of the congestion faced by jurisdiction j's public
services caused by the mass of households in jurisdiction j0 depends on the spillovers
coecient j's public services creates in j0 is quite reasonable, since public services will
suer more from an important mass of households in a jurisdiction that receives a lot
2For instance, spillovers coecients can represent the distance between two jurisdictions (the
closer jurisdiction j is to jurisdiction j0, the closer to 1 will be jj0), or be aected by political
agreements concluded between jurisdictions...
5of spillovers from these public services than from a important mass of households that
receives little spillovers. Moreover, it is assumed that if jurisdiction j's public services
create no spillovers in jurisdiction j0 (i.e. j0j = 0), then the congestion function is
constant with respect to j0. Formally,




However, one could specify the congestion measure in such a way that there would be
no relation between congestion and the spillovers coecients. The present denition
of the congestion measure does not exclude such an assumption. The only properties
assumed on the congestion function are that:










The rst property is certainly restrictive, but not unreasonable though, it requires
that the marginal congestion in one jurisdiction generated by a innitesimal increase
of the mass of household, in this very jurisdiction or another one, tends to be null
when the mass of households is innite. Homogeneous functions of degree less than
1, for instance, respect this property.
The second property is more natural since, to a certain extent, the masses of
households in dierent jurisdictions are substitutable concerning the congestion they
provide in one jurisdiction.
We denote   as the set of all congestion function satisfying the properties dened
above.
Denition A economy is composed of 5 elements:
 A wealth distribution !
 Preferences represented by the utility function U 2 U
 A congestion measure C 2  
 A spillovers coecient matrix B 2 B
 A set of location L 2 N
We denote  as the set of all conceivable economies.
For simplicity, we denote Fj =
$j
Cj as jurisdiction j's scal potential, that is to say
the maximal available amount of public services jurisdiction j can produce (if tj = 1).
The demands for housing and private consumption of a household i depend on his
after-tax wealth (1   tj)!i and on the housing price in jurisdiction j, pj. In every
jurisdiction, px is normalized to 1. We dened hM(pj;(1 tj)!i) and xM(pj;(1 tj)!i)
6as respectively the Marshallian demand for housing and for private consumption3 of
a household i in a jurisdiction j, e.g.




pjh + x = (1   tj)!i
The local tax rate is determined according to a democratic rule. Hence, every
household has to determine its favorite tax rate, denoted t : R4
+ ! [0;1], which is a
function of:
 the scal potential F,
 the spillovers from other jurisdictions' public services S (taken as given),
 the housing price p,




U((tF;S);hM(p;(1   t)!i);(1   t)!i   phM(p;(1   t)!i))
Lemma 1. For all utility functions belonging to U, 8(F;S;p;!i) 2 R4
+ and for all
functions  : R2
+ ! R+ satisfying the above properties, preferences are single-peaked
with respect to t, so t(F;S;p;!i) exists .
Proof. The proof of this lemma can be easily obtained by showing that the utility
function is concave with respect to t, so there exists an unique
t 2 arg max
t2[0;1]
U((tF;S);hM(p;(1   t)!i);(1   t)!i   phM(p;(1   t)!i))
Let us denote
gij : R+  ! R+
t 7 ! gij(t) = U((tF;S);hM(p;(1   t)!i);xM(p;(1   t)!i))astheutilityofahouseholdilivinginjurisdictionjdependingonthetaxrate:
Thefirstderivativeofthisfunctionwithrespecttotis :
@gij(t)
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as respectively the lowest and the highest tax rate preferred by a household living in
jurisdiction j.
Denition A jurisdictions structure is a vector 
 = (J;fIjgj2J;(ftjgj2J);(fpjgj2J);(fSjgj2J).
Denition A jurisdictions structure 
 = (J;(fIjgj2J);(ftjgj2J);(fpjgj2J);(fSjgj2J)
is stable in the economy (!;U;C;B;L) if and only if
3Under the homothetic separability assumption, those Marshallian demands do not depend on
the amount of public services, that is the reason why Z is withdrawn from the arguments of the
Marshallian demands.
71. 8j;j0 2 J;8i 2 Ij;U(Zj;hij;(1   tj)!i   pjhij)  V (Zj0; (pj0)(1   tj0)!i), with
hij being the amount of housing in j consumed by household i,
2. 8j 2 J;
R
Ij
hM(pj;(1   tj)!i)d = Hj
3. 8j 2 J;tj 2 [t
j; t
j]
In words, a jurisdictions structure is stable if and only if :
1. No household can increase its utility by modifying its consumption bundle or by
leaving its jurisdiction,
2. The housing prices are competitive in every jurisdiction (supply equals demand),
3. The tax rate is democratically chosen in every jurisdiction.
Let us now express formally the denition of the segregation, which is the same
denition as in [3].
Denition A jurisdictions structure 
 = (J;(fIjgj2J);(ftjgj2J);(fpjgj2J);(fSjgj2J)
in the economy (!;U;C;B;L) is segregated if and only if 8!h;!i;!k 2 R+ such
that !h < !i < !k, (h;k) 2 Ij and i 2 Ij0 ) Zj = Zj0 and 8! 2 R+;V C(Zj;pj;(1  
tj)!) = V C(Zj0;pj0;(1   tj0)!)
In words, a jurisdictions structure is wealth-segregated if, except for groups of ju-
risdictions oering the same amount of public services and in which every household
would have the same utility, the poorest household of a jurisdiction with a high per
capita wealth is (weakly) richer than the richest household in a jurisdiction with a
lower per capita wealth.
Let us dene Jj = fk 2 J : Zk = Zj and  (pk)(1 tk) =  (pj)(1 tj)g. In words,
Jj is the set of all jurisdictions oering the same amount of available public services
as j, and such that households have the same purchasing power within the meaning
of Hicks4. Obviously, for all j 2 J, households are indierent between all jurisdictions
belonging to Jj.




Ik is a connected subset of I.
3 Examples
This section presents 2 examples of economies, where congestion and spillovers are
introduced in turn, so as to examine their impact on the jurisdictions structure at the
equilibrium. In the rst example, households' preferences are homothetically separa-
ble between the local public services on one hand, and the private spendings on the
other hand, but violate the GCS condition (and so the monotonicity of the preferred
tax rate function with respect to the private wealth).
In the second one, on the contrary, the GCS condition and the monotonicity of
the preferred tax rate function hold, but not the homothetical separability. However,
we construct a stable and yet non-segregated jurisdictions structure, which show that
neither the GSC condition nor the monotonicity of the preferred tax rate function are
42 vectors of prices and wealth (p1;:::pK;R) and (p0
1;::;p0
K;R0) provide the same purchasing
power within the meaning of Hicks if and only if V (p1;:::pK;R) = V (p0
1;::;p0
K;R0)
8sucient to ensure the segregation of any stable jurisdictions structure if preferences
are not homothetically separable. We also show that the GSC condition, that implies
the condition identied by Westho to ensure the existence of an equilibrium, is not
anymore sucient when congestion eects are allowed.
3.1 First example: the eect of congestion and spillovers on a
stable jurisdictions structure
In this example, we start from a situation where the jurisdictions structure is stable
and non segregated. We rst assume that public services do not generate spillovers
nor suer from congestion. Then, we introduce congestion eects, which will lead
to instability. The new jurisdictions structure will then be segregated. Finally, we
consider that local public services generate spillovers, and again, the jurisdictions
structure will not be stable anymore, and the rst jurisdictions structure will arise.
This example suggests that congestion eects increase the segregative properties of
endogenous jurisdictions formation, while the presence of spillovers mitigates them.
Let us consider the example provided by Gravel & Thoron, improved by the pres-
















Such an utility function is continuous, twice dierentiable, increasing and concave
with respect to every argument. The indirect utility function conditional to the public
services is given by





















Consider an economy with 2 jurisdictions j1 and j2 and 3 types of households
a;b;c with private wealth !a = 2  
p




2, b = 8 and c = 1
30. For simplicity, let us assume that the tax rate is
determined through the majority voting rule, and that the housing supply is perfectly
elastic with respect to its price, that will be considered as xed to 1 in both jurisdic-
tions.
For all !i  3+
p
7
2 , the preferred tax rate function is given by
t(F;S;!i) =
!i   2 +
p
(!i   2)2 + 2
2!i
Determining the preferred tax rate function of an households endowed with a private
wealth greater than 3+
p
7
2 will not be required, since households of type c will never
be majoritary in their jurisdiction, so their preferred tax rate will never be applied.
One can observe that the preferred tax rate does not depend on the scal potential,
which will greatly facilitate the example.
9Let us assume rst that there is no congestion and no spillovers. Then, the avail-
able amount of public services in a jurisdiction j is simply the tax revenue: Zj = tj$j.
Suppose that households of type a and c live in j1, while households of type b live
in j2. Then, in both jurisdictions, the aggregate wealth will be equal to 12, the tax
rate in j1, denoted t1, will be equal to 1
2, while t2 = 1
3. Since, at rst, it is assumed
that C1 = C2 = 1 and S1 = S2 = 0, one has Z1 = 6 and Z2 = 4. Such a jurisdictions
structure is stable, since the scal potential is the same in both jurisdictions, house-
holds of type a and b have their favorite tax rate in their respective jurisdiction, and
households of type c are better-o in j1, in which they enjoy an utility level equal to
ln(6) + 15
4  5:54, against ln(4) + 4  5:51 if they would move to j2.































which will leads households of type c to move to j2, in which they will enjoy an utility






16(ln(1;75) 1)  5:424 while their utility level








) + 1545:402 if they had stayed in j1. Households
of type a and b would not have incentive to move, since households of type a would
enjoy an utility level of approximatively 2:74 in j1 against 2:71 in j2, and households
of type b, an utility level of 4:30 in j2 and 4:09 in j1.
Is the new jurisdictions structure stable after that households of type c had moved
from j1 to j2? Since the preferred tax rate function is constant with respect to the
scal potential, the tax rate will be the same in every jurisdiction. Once households



















so households of type a will get a higher utility level in j1 than in j2 (approximatively
2:73 against 2:71, while households of type b and of type c can enjoy a higher utility
level by staying in j2 than if they moved to j1, respectively with 4:30 against 4:08 for
households of type b and 5:43 against 5:39 for households of type c, so this new struc-
ture is stable and segregated, while the previous one was stable and non-segregated
10as long as no congestion eects were assumed. In this very specic example, the con-
gestion seems to increase the segregative properties of the endogenous jurisdictions
structure formation.
Let us now introduce spillovers in the example to observe what impact they can
have. Suppose that jurisdiction j1's local public services generates spillovers in ju-
risdiction j2, and vice-versa. For instance, suppose that the available amount in a









Ck . Since local public services generate spillovers in other ju-
risdictions, it is not unreasonable to assume that the congestion function also depends
on the mass of households in other jurisdictions and on the spillovers coecients. Let
us then redene the congestion function as follows:







Although j1 produces more public services than j2, suppose that jurisdiction j1 re-



















hence 12 = 1
3 and 21 = 1
5.
With such spillovers coecients, the available amounts of public services house-
holds can enjoy are now









As a consequence, households of type c will move back to j1, in which they will be
able to enjoy an utility level of approximatively 6:17, against 6:10 if they stayed in
j2. Households of type a and b can not increase their utility by voting with their feet,
since households of type a's utility is about 3:51 in j1 while it would be about 3:38 in
j2, and households of type b have an utility level of approximatively 4:97 in j2 against
4:86 if they moved to j1.
Finally, the jurisdictions structure in which jurisdiction j1 is composed of house-
holds of type a and c, and j2 is composed of households of type b is stable: with
households of type c in j1 instead of j2,
Z1  11:513
5for instance, j1 may have implemented a restrictive policy in order to prevent households living
in j2 from congesting its public services.
11and
Z2  7:18
One can observe that, due to the existence of spillovers between jurisdictions, house-
holds of type c's change of jurisdiction has almost no impact on the available amount
of public services in each jurisdiction, then the utility levels will remains almost the
same for all type of households.
As a conclusion, this example suggests that congestion favors the segregative prop-
erties of endogenous jurisdictions formation, whereas the existence of spillovers tends
to decrease the number of stable segregated jurisdictions structures.
However, in the next section, the validity of the GCS condition, that was neces-
sary and sucient to ensure the segregation of every stable jurisdictions structure, is
established within the existence of congestion eect and spillovers.
3.2 Second example: what if preferences are not homotheti-
cally separable?
The example follows 2 aims: showing that the GSC condition is not sucient anymore
if preferences are not homothetically separable between public services on one hand
and the composite private good and the housing on the other, and then emphasizing
the fact that more restrictive conditions must be found to ensure the existence of an
equilibrium when public services suer from congestion.
In this example, preferences are represented by the following function:
U : R3
+  ! R+
(Z;x;h) 7 ! ln(Z) + ln(1 + x) + ln(h)






















Clearly, local public services are a gross substitute to both the private good, and
preferences are not homothetic between the composite private good and the housing.
One can notice that it is equivalent to the condition identied by Westho to ensure
12the existence of an equilibrium (see lemma 4 below).
For a price of public service equal to !i
$ and a price of the composite private good
normalized to 1, the preferred tax rate function is given by :
t($;ph;R) =
 1
2 if R < 2
R+1
3R otherwise
One can see that the preferred tax rate function is constant and then strictly de-
creasing with respect to the private wealth.
Let us suppose that there are 2 jurisdictions j1 and j2 and three types of house-
holds a;b;c respectively with private wealth 0;5, 2 and 5 with a = 2, b = 5 and
c = 4:2. Let assume rst that there is no congestion eect nor spillovers, and that
the technology is linear, so Z = t$.
Suppose that households of type a and c live in j1, while households of type b live
in j2. Consequently, if the tax rate is determined through the majority voting rule,
then, one has $1 = 22, t1 = 0;4 so Z1 = 8;8, and $2 = 10, t2 = 0;5 so Z1 = 5. If
we assume that housing prices are respectively 2 and 1 in j1 and j2 and the available
amount of land, 4:5 and 5, then the jurisdictions structure is stable: households of
type a have an utility of 0:28 while it would be only 0:22 in j2, households of type
b, an utility of 0:92 (against 0:88 in j1) and households of type c, an utility of 2:17
(against 1:88 in j2).
If congestion are introduced, with Z = t$
C , with C = 1+
p
, then the jurisdictions
structure is not stable anymore, because households of type a would be better of by
moving to j2, since their utility would  0:86 against  0:97 if they stayed in j1. The
new jurisdictions structure will have households of type a moving in j2, while other
households will stay in their jurisdiction. But this jurisdictions structure will not be
stable neither, because, due to the evolution of the total demand in each jurisdiction,
housing prices will increase in j2 to 1:1, and decrease in j2 to 28
15. Consequently,
households of type a will have incentive to move back to j1, because their utility
would be  0:9 against  0:95 if they stayed in j2, while other households could not
increase their utility by moving to the other jurisdiction. This will lead to a cycle, so
no equilibrium will arise.
Such a result proves that, contrary to Westho's model, the single crossing of
the indierence curves in the (t;Z) space is not sucient to ensure the existence of
an equilibrium when there is a competitive housing market and when public services
suer from congestion eect.
4 Results
The main result of this paper is the robustness of the GSC condition to the existence
of spillovers and congestion eect on the local public services to have all stable ju-
risdictions structures segregated. As in Gravel and Thoron (2007), this condition is
equivalent to the monotonicity of the preferred tax rate function with respect to the
private wealth, for any given amount of the other arguments. To prove this equiva-
lence, let us rst establish the following lemma.
13Denition Let us dene
 1 : R+  ! R+
Z 7 !  1(Z;  S) as the amount of available
public services produced in a jurisdiction needed to have a total available amount of
public services Z if the amount of spillovers is  S. Formally, ( 1(Z;  S);  S) = Z
Since 8 S 2 R+;(;  S) is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to ,
 1(Z;S) always exists.
Lemma 2. 8U 2 U, 8(F;S;p;!i) 2 R4
+, the preferred tax rate function is a mono-






















The FOC of the utility maximization program with respect to t implies that:
UZ((tF;S);hM(p;(1   t)!i);(1   t)!i   phM(p;(1   t)!i))





because, using the envelop theorem, we know that pUx = Uh. Then, using (2) and





Since Marshallian demands are homogeneous of degree 0, we can divide all the argu-






















This lemma states that the favorite tax rate function is equivalent to an increasing
function of the Marshallian demand for public services. This lemma is used to prove
that the favorite tax rate function is monotonic with respect to the private wealth if
and only if the public services are either always a substitute or always a complement
to the housing and the available wealth. This condition is called the Gross Substi-
tutability Complementarity (GSC) condition.
If the GCS condition holds, then, one has either ZM(pZ;px;ph;R)px  08(pZ;px;ph;R)
(if Z is a gross complement to x) or ZM(pZ;px;ph;R)px  08(pZ;px;ph;R) (if Z is
a gross substitute to x)
For all utility function that are homothetically separable between the public ser-
vices on one hand and the housing and private consumption on the other, the public
services is a complement (resp. a substitute) to the private consumption if and only
if it is also a complement (resp. a substitute) to the housing.
14Lemma 3. If public services are a non-Gien good, then, for all utility functions
belonging to U and all production function  that are increasing and concave with
respect to , the favorite tax rate function is always monotonic with respect to private
wealth if and only if the public services are a gross substitute or a gross complement
to the 2 other goods.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we will show that the derivative of the preferred tax rate
function with respect to the private wealth can be expressed as a negative function
of the derivative of the Marshallian demand for the public services with respect to
the housing price. Consequently, the preferred tax rate function will be monotonic
with respect to the private wealth if and only if the Marshallian demand for public
services are monotonic with respect to the housing price (or the composite private
good price).



































































Since the public services is assumed to be a non-Gien good, and since (;S) is






















The GSC condition is restrictive enough to be discussed, but nevertheless it is not
outlandish. For instance, suppose that the only competence the central government
has transferred to the studied jurisdictions level is social aid. Then, one may assume
that the public services will be a substitute to the two other goods. On the contrary,
if the jurisdiction is competent only in cultural activities, then the public services will
probably be a complement. Suppose now that the jurisdiction is in charge of primary
schools. In this case, the relation between the public services and the other goods is
not trivial, and may vary with respect to the jurisdiction's parameters and the private
wealth.
To prove the suciency of the GSC condition, the notion of indierence curve has
to be introduced.
Denition 8(t;  u;p;S;!i) 2 [0;1]  R4
+, let us dene F  u( u;t;p;S;!i):
U((tF  u( u;p;t;S;!i);S);hM(p;(1   t)!i);xM(p;(1   t)!i))   u
15as the indierence curve of a household with private wealth !i, that is to say the
amount of scal potential the household needs to reach utility  u in a jurisdiction with
housing price p, tax rate t and spillovers S.
The assumptions imposed on the utility function and on (:) ensure the existence
and the derivability of Fu.The slope of the indierence curve in the plane (t,F) is
given by
F  u





(tF;S)MRS u((t  F;S);(1   t)!i)
   F] (7)
The next lemma, that will be used to prove the suciency of the GSC condition
to have every stable jurisdictions structure segregated, states that the GSC condition
implies the ordering of the indierence curves slopes with respect to wealth.
Lemma 4. For any preferences belonging to U and any production function that is







@t 8(t;p;S) 2 [0;1]  R2
+;!i < !k and 8U 2 U if the public services is
a gross substitute for (resp. a gross complement to) the two other goods6.
Proof. This lemma states that if the GSC condition holds, then, for any given hous-
ing price, any given amount of spillovers and any tax rate, the slope of the indier-
ence curves in the (t;F) space is monotonic with respect to the private wealth. We
prove this lemma by using the denition of F  u( u;t;p;S;!i) introduced above. The
proof is provided for the gross complementary case, the gross substitutability case
being symmetric. Assume that the public services is a gross complement to the two
other goods. Then, by denition,
@Z
M(pZ;ph;px;!i
@ph < 0 and
@Z
M(pZ;ph;px;!i
@px < 0. Let
(t;F;S;p) 2 [0;1]R4
+ be a certain combination of tax rate, scal potential, spillovers
and housing price and (a;b) 2 R2
+ two amount of private wealth (a < b). Let us dene






























;1) = (1   t)a
Hence, the Marginal Rate of Substitution between the public services on one hand,
and the housing and the other expenditure on the other hand, which is a function
MRSu(Z;h + m) is equal, at the optimum, to the price ratio, and, by denition, the
chosen bundle respects the budget constraint :










6Actually, the ordering of the indierence curve slopes with respect to the private wealth is
equivalent to the GSC condition, but the implication is sucient to prove our theorem. However, it
shows that the GSC condition implies the condition identied by Westho to ensure the existence
of an equilibrium, when households have identical preferences.






Let us now dene !(b) such that
p
!(b) and 1
!(b) are respectively the highest housing
price and available money price that would allow a household with private wealth 1
to aord the bundle (not necessarily the optimal one) ((tF;S);h;x), with
ph+x
!(b) =
(1   t)b, if the public services price is still 1






























MRS u((tF;S);(1   t)b) 
!(k)
(tF;S)F(a)
which is equivalent to





Using (10), one obtains:
MRS u((tF;S);(1   t)b)
b





MRS u((tF;S);(1   t)b)

a
MRS u((tF;S);(1   t)a)
Using the denition of F  u
t given by (7), the implication is established.
This lemma is particularly important to prove the suciency of this article's main
result, which is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any possible economy (!;U;C;B;L) 2 , every stable jurisdictions
structure will be segregated if and only if U is such that the GSC condition is satised.
Let us begin the proof of this theorem by the suciency of the condition.
Proposition 1. For all economies (!;U;C;B;L) 2 , if the GSC condition holds,
then every stable jurisdictions structure is segregated.
17Proof. To prove this proposition, we use the lemma 4 to demonstrate that if a non-
segregated jurisdictions structure arise at the equilibrium, then the GSC condition
is not respected. This proof needs no assumption on how the spillovers coecients
are determined. Suppose that there exist 2 jurisdictions j1 and j2 with respective
parameters (F1;S1;t1;p1) and (F2;S2;t2;p2) and 3 households with private wealth
a;b;c, a < b < c, such that :
V C((t1F1);S1); (p1)(1   t1)a) > V C((t2F2;S2); (p2)(1   t2)a)
V C((t1F1);S1); (p1)(1   t1)b) < V C((t2F2;S2); (p2)(1   t2)b)
V C((t1F1);S1); (p1)(1   t1)c) > V C((t2F2;S2); (p2)(1   t2)c)
Suppose, with no loss of generality, that p1 > p2.
Consider the hypothetical jurisdiction j0 with parameters (F0;S2;t0;p2) with t0 =
1   (1   t1)
(p1)
(p2) and F0 =

 1((t1F1;S1);S2)
t0 Hence, every household is indierent
between j1 and j0, because in both jurisdictions, the amount of available public
services is the same and their purchasing power is the same. Then,
V C((t0F0);S2); (p2)(1   t0)a) > V C(Z2; (p2)(1   t2)a)
V C((t0F0);S2); (p2)(1   t0)b) < V C(Z2; (p2)(1   t2)b)
V C((t0F0);S2); (p2)(1   t0)c) > V C(Z2; (p2)(1   t2)c)
which, according to the lemma 4, is impossible if the GSC condition holds.
Now that the suciency of the GCS condition to have all stable jurisdictions
structure segregated has been proved, the following proposition states that it is also
necessary, by showing that any violation of the GCS condition allows to construct a
non-segregated but yet stable jurisdictions structure.
Proposition 2. For all economies belonging to , every stable jurisdictions structure
will be segregated only if the GSC condition holds.
Proof. The proof of this proposition consists in constructing a stable and yet non-
segregated jurisdictions structure. We are free to determine the number of jurisdic-
tions, their available amount of housing, the mass of each type of households in every
jurisdiction, and the spillovers coecients matrix, in order to generate the housing
price, the scal potential and the amount of spillovers for which the violation of the
GSC condition arise.
Consider an utility function violating the GCS condition for some (  F;  S;  p) 2 R3
+
and some non-degenerated interval W  R+. Using lemma 3, the monotonicity
of the favorite tax rate function is known to be equivalent to the GSC condition,
so we know for sure that there exist (a;b;c) 2 W3, with a < b < c, such that
t(  F;  S;  p;a) = t(  F;  S;  p;c) > t(  F;  S;  p;b) (the proof is the same if the favorite tax
rate is increasing and then decreasing with respect to the private wealth). Then
one can always construct a stable and non-segregated jurisdictions structure. Let
us create 2 subsets of jurisdictions, both jurisdictions having a scal potential  F, a
housing price p and receiving an amount of spillovers  S:
 jurisdictions belonging to J1 are composed of certain measures a and c of
households endowed with private wealth a and c, and apply a tax rate t1 =
t(  F;  S;  p;a) = t(  F;  S;  p;c)
18 jurisdictions belonging to J2 are composed of a certain measure b of households
endowed with private wealth b, and apply a tax rate t2 = t(  F;  S;  p;b).
Such a jurisdictions structure is clearly non-segregated, because the 2 dierent types
of jurisdiction provide dierent amounts of public services. Moreover, no household
has incentive to leave its jurisdiction, since its favorite tax rate is applied, and other
parameters are the same in all the other jurisdictions. Let us now prove that there
always exist positive measures a;b;c, integers M1 and M2 of jurisdictions of re-
spectively type 1 and type 2, a matrix of spillovers coecients and available amount
of housing H1 and H2 such that, in each jurisdiction :
 Spillovers are equal to  S,
 Fiscal potential is equal to  F,
 Housing price  p is competitive.
We dene respectively 1 = t1  F and 2 = t2  F as the amount of public services
produced by jurisdictions of type 1 and of type 2. For simplicity, jurisdictions in J1
will not create any spillovers for jurisdictions belonging to J2, and vice-versa. Since
the function S(:) is non-bounded from above, we know that
8S 2 R+;8(~ ; ~ ) 2 R2
+ ;9M 2 N : (M   1)~ ~  < S  M ~ ~ 
In words, for any strictly positive amount of produced public services and spillovers
coecient, by duplicating a jurisdiction a certain number of times, any amount of
spillovers can be bounded from below and from above, even if spillovers coecients
depend on the amount of public services produced by the jurisdiction can generate or
receive spillovers. Since S = 0 when the spillovers coecient are null, one can deduce,
using the Theorem of Intermediate Value, that 9 2 [0;  ] : M~  = S
As a consequence, we can always nd (M1;1) and (M2;2) such that
M111 = M222 =  S
Now, let us prove that we can always nd a positive measures a;b;c such that, in
each jurisdiction, the scal potential is  F. Let us consider a jurisdiction j belonging
to J2. This jurisdiction is only composed of households endowed with a private wealth
b. Since all jurisdictions in J2 have the same measure of households and the same
spillovers coecients, the congestion function can be re-written as a function of the
measure of households, the spillovers coecient and the number of jurisdictions in J2.
Let us dene CJ2(2;b;M2) = C(fbgj2J2;f2gl2J2). Hence, the scal potential of
this jurisdiction j is Fj =
bb
C(2;b;M2).












19Then 8(j;k;k0) 2 J3;8(k;k0) 2 R2
++, and 80


















By denition, one has lim
k!+1
@Cj(1;:::;k;:::; k0;:::;M2;fljgl2J)
@k = 0. Then, using the






































Moreover, if the mass of households in a jurisdiction is null, then so is its scal







b;M2) = F. The same reasoning can be applied for jurisdictions in J1,
taking a constant mass of households with private wealth a over mass of households
with private wealth c ratio. We now choose the available amount of housing H1
and H2 respectively in jurisdictions in J1 and J2 such that the housing price  p is
competitive, i.e.
H1 = ahM( p;(1   t1)a) + chM( p;(1   t1)c)
H2 = bhM( p;(1   t2)b)
Then, for any violation of the monotonicity of the preferred tax rate function with
respect to the private wealth, one can always construct a stable and yet non-segregated
jurisdictions structure.
7The Squeeze theorem (also called the Sandwich rule) states that if 8x 2 E;u(x)  f(x)  v(x)
then, 8 x 2 E such that lim
x! x
u(x) = l and lim
x! x
v(x) = l, one has lim
x! x
f(x) = l.
82003, Chap. 3, Section 1, the Ham Sandwich Theorem






v0(x) if u and v are dierentiable.
205 Conclusion
The conclusion of this paper is that neither the congestion nor the existence of
spillovers across jurisdictions modify the necessity or the suciency of the GSC con-
dition to ensure the segregation of every stable jurisdictions structure in a model a la
Westho.
However, this result does not imply that introducing congestion and spillovers into
a model a la Westho would have no impact on the stability or on the segregative
properties of endogenous jurisdictions structures formation, as the example provided
in section 3 proved it.
The presence of congestion eects obviously mitigates the existence of an equi-
librium. Consequently, stronger conditions must be found in order to ensure that a
stable jurisdictions structure will arise.
This condition is robust to several generalizations of the model. Searching for a
generalization that would make the condition either too weak or too strong to have all
stable jurisdictions structures would be a interesting objective for further researches.
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